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COMMENTS
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION: THE PURCHASE REQUIREMENT
FOR GROUP FILINGS UNDER SECTION 13 (d)
OF THE 1934 SECURITIES ACT
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971)
Plaintiff, issuer, alleged that defendants, members of the Milstein
family, agreed to pool their preferred stock in issuer to gain control.
Issuer claimed the members of the group held more than ten percent
of the outstanding preferred shares; and therefore, that the group upon
formation should have filed the appropriate information required by
section 13(d) of the Securities Act of 1934. Injunctive relief was sought
The trial court granted stockholder's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.' On appeal, held: reversed.2 The formation of a group
whose members collectively hold more than ten percent of a class of a
registerable security is a reportable event under section 13 (d) of the
1934 Securities Act.
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19341 to regulate security
trading. The legislators chose disclosure as a principle means of accom-
plishing their regulatory goals.' They believed that enforced disclosure
would simultaneously effect two purposes: (1) discourage fraudulent
and deceptive trading practices, and (2) encourage the disclosure
,)f information that will assist investors in making rational decisions.5
1. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1971) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat.
881) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Securities Act].
4. See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURmEs MARKETS OF TIE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); SEC, Dis-
CLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33
AND '34 ACTs 10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT]; 1 L. Loss, SEc TrImS
REGULATION 21 (2d ed. 1961). For an article discussing the use of disclosure before
the Williams Act, see Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L.
REv. 607 (1964). For an article noting the rise of suits seeking to force disclosure
see Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New Direction For Federal Cor-
poration Law, 15 N.Y.L.F. 674, 675 (1969).
5. WHEAT REPORT at 10.
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Amendments to the original act have extended the disclosure require-
ments to previously uncovered areas,0 and to security dealer's trading
practices. 7  One such amendment, the Williams Act, was enacted in
1968 to require the disclosure of certain information by persons or
groups who either extend tender offers to stockholders, or make sudden
large-scale acquisitions of a registerable class of an issuer's securities,
Since passage of the Williams Act, the courts have issued conflicting
opinions on the question of when a group of shareholders is required to
file under section 13 (d). In Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot,' the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a group that otherwise qualified under
13 (d) must also agree to purchase additional securities before the group
would be required to file.10 Since the Bath court realized that
plaintiffs would find it nearly impossible to prove the existence of
such an agreement, the court formulated a rebuttable presumption
to help plaintiffs. This presumption, which is actually a sepa-
rate test, provided that once any member of an otherwise qualify-
ing 13 (d) group purchased any additional securities, the group will be
presumed to have formed an intent to make purchases of securities and
thus must file." The district court in Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox 2
went further saying that members of an otherwise qualifying group must
make a purposeful acquisition 3 of more than two percent 4 of the class
of securities held by the group before a group filing would be required.
6. See, e.g., Act of August 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 565 amending various sections of
the 1934 Securities Act (extending Act's coverage to securities traded in the over-the-
counter markets). For the legislative history of the 1964 amendment, see H.R. REP.
No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); 2 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3013 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Act of August 10, 1954, tit. II, §§ 201, 202, 68 Stat. 683, amending
§§ 11(d), 12(d) of the 1934 Securities Act (altering the prohibition against the ex-
tension of credit by security dealers to purchasers).
8. Act of July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454, amending §§ 12-14 of the 1934 Securities
Act. [The acquisition provision will hereinafter be referred to as section 13(d).]
9. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir.), rehearing denied (July 17, 1970).
10. Id. at 110.
11. Id.
12. 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
13. The court said that defendant Cox had become a stockholder by inheritance
and thus had not made a purpositive acquisition; consequently a 13(d)(1) filing by
him would not contribute to the maintenance of fair and honest markets. Id. at
1117-18. For a contrary interpretation of the Act, see Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Ex-
press, Inc., CCH Fmn. SFC. L. REP. 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (individual inheritor
must file).
14. The court said the Williams Act was designed to protect the investing public
against the impact on the market of undisclosed take-over activities by means of ac-
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In the principal case the court rejected this interpretation and an-
nounced that a group must file immediately after its formation. 5 Group
formation occurs when shareholders agree to pool their shares in an
effort to affect corporate matters.' 6 Apparently pooling need not in-
volve the transfer of securities or the adoption of an enforceable agree-
ment to act together.
The Williams Act was intended to fill in a gap in the securities laws,
for Congress recognized the potential impact of a change in corporate
control. 17  It was evident that certain information concerning persons
or groups who might effect shifts in control would assist investors in
making rational decisions. Pre-existing provisions required persons or
groups who sought to acquire control either by a share-for-share ex-
change' s or through a proxy battle' 9 to disclose their identity and plans.
Other means of acquiring control were unregulated under the securities
laws. Two of these, the take-over bid and the large-scale acquisition
of stock became increasingly popular with control seekers since they
were less expensive than a proxy fight, were immediately decisive on the
quisitions in excess of the exempt two percent amount. Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox,
326 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1971). The exemption discussed provides, "any
acquisition . . . which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person of
securities of the same class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2
percentum of that class [is exempt]" § 13(d)(6)(B). The Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of New York in Committee for New Management of Butler
Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F. Supp. 146, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) also applied this ex-
emption to group acquisitions. The Milstein decision, however, destroys the vitality of
the Widmark decision, since the Second Circuit's holding in Milstein establishes the
rule for the entire circuit. However, it is interesting to note that one member of the
group in the Butler case had made purchases exceeding two percent prior to group for-
mation without filing. The Widmark court did not permit these purchases to have any
impact on the group's filing status. 335 F. Supp. at 155. Milstein does not affect this
holding.
15. 453 F.2d 709, 713, 718.
16. Id. at 715-18. The court relied heavily upon Comment, Section 13(d) and
Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 853, 869-72 (1971).
There the author argued that the Williams Act was intended to protect investors from
the impact of significant shifts in corporate voting power regardless of how these
shifts were accomplished.
17. A change in control brings with it the possibility of different operating results
and different investment results, or perhaps the possibility of realizing on a company's
liquidation value. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of
Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149, 151 (1966). The "gap" was noted by authorities who
suggested corrections, see, e.g., Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap
in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 498 (1967).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1971).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971).
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question of future control, and could be initiated in relative secrecy-"
The Williams Act was specifically designed to cover both of these
situations and thereby provide increased investor protection.2" Under
the Act control seekers must expose their identity, financial sources,
strength, and future plans for the corporation. 2  Congress expected
management to respond to 13 (d) disclosures by announcing their plans
for the corporation. These announcements coupled with the 13 (d)
disclosures would provide investors with valuable information on which
to base their future market decisions. 23
There were, however, many witnesses at the committee hearings who
testified that the disclosure requirement would primarily serve to dis-
courage control take-overs and perpetuate management.24 In response
the Committee stated that the Williams Act did not "tip the scales in
favor of management."' '25 This was either a mere wishful conclusion
about the Act's projected impact or an indication of how the Act should
be read. The Seventh Circuit and the Ozark court chose the latter inter-
pretation and construed the Act to require disclosure only after the
group formulated an intent to purchase or actually purchased additional
securities.2 6
Congress was aware that groups of persons might agree to seek con-
20. See, e.g., Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Dis-
tinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 Hnv. J. LExs. 431, 448-49 (1968); Note,
The Williams Amendments: An Evaluation of the Early Returns, 23 VA,.. L. REV.
700-01 (1970). In his article Swanson noted that partial disclosure of takeovers was
accomplished under section 10b and 14a, but these sections did not supply sufficient
regulation. Swanson supra, at 457-66.
21. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) also reported in 2 United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2811 (1968)
[hereinafter cited U.S. News]. See also 119 Cong. Rec. 21954 (1968) (remarks of
Senator Bennett).
22. § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E) 1934 Securities Act.
23. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
24. One authority discussing Bath noted that 13(d) seemed to have realized these
fears. 24 Sw. LJ. 542, 551 (1970). For a discussion of possible corporate de-
fenses to takeovers see Comment, 44 TuL. L. REV. 517 (1970). An earlier proposed
amendment, S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), which was designed specifically to
protect management from corporate take-over efforts failed to pass. For a discussion
of how this proposal related to the Williams Act, see Comment, 71 COLUM. L. REv.
466, 469 (1971).
25. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. Rm,. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968), 2 U.S. News 2813-14. It was felt that such discouragement
of tender offers that the bill would cause was "a small price to pay for adequate investor
protection." Id.
26. See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
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trol and that such a collective force was equally able to effect control
as an individual.27 Under section 13(d) (1), as long as no one member
held the required amount of shares,"8 no filing would be required and
the group could proceed undetected. Congress closed this potential
loophole by adding section 13 (d) (3):
When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership,
syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or dis-
posing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be dis-
cerned a "person" for the purpose of this subsection.
The Second Circuit applied section 13(d) (3) and found that the
Milsteins were a 13(d) (3) "group". 29  The court attempted to bolster
this conclusion by noting that the group allegedly held the Milsteins'
shares for the purpose of acquiring control." Having found the Mil-
steins to be a 13(d) (3) group and thus a 13(d) (1) "person," the court
went on to say the group "must be treated as an entity separate and
distinct from its members."3' 1 The court then concluded that, through
their pooling agreement, the Milstein group, "when formed, had acquired
a beneficial interest in the individual holdings of its members"32 and
27. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 8 (1968), 2 U.S. News 2818. The
language in this part of the report supports the Milstein court's conclusion that filing
is required ten days after the group members agree to act together whether or not any
member of the group acquired additional securities. The Bath court noted that this
passage conflicted with other passages in the legislative history which indicated that a
subsequent purchase was necessary to trigger the filing requirement. Bath Indus., Inc.
v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970).
One possible explanation is that § 13(d)(3) was incorporated into the Act as an
afterthought to close a potential loophole, and the legislators failed to adequately con-
sider the impact of this addition by altering the basic act to provide consistency.
28. The original requirement that a person acquire ten percent of a class of a
security registerable under § 12 of the 1934 Securities Act was subsequently lowered
to require filing after a five percent acquisition, Act of December 22, 1970, 84 Stat.
149, amending § 13(d)(1) of the 1934 Securities Act. The courts have stated that
this change should not be applied retroactively. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d
709, 718 n.17; Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508, 517 (D.R.I.
1972).
29. "On the assumption that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, we cannot
conclude other than that the four Milsteins constituted a 'group' . . .", 453 F.2d at
715. The court here failed to say why the facts mandated this conclusion. A similar,
unsupported conclusion in Bath was severely criticized. See 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1136,
1137-40 (1970); 24 Sw. L.J. 542, 549 (1970). For an example of a court which
summarily concluded that a group did not qualify as a 13(d)(3) group see Nicholson
File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508, 518 (D.R.I. 1972).
30. 453 F.2d 709, 715.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 716. The court accepted the Bath court's statement that for purposes of
577
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should have filed upon formation. This conclusion was supported by
sections of the legislative history 3 and by the court's interpretation of
the Act's overall purpose as being "to alert the market place to every
rapid large-scale aggregation or accumulation of securities . . .which
might represent a potential shift in corporate control. '34
There are several problems with this decision. First, although the
court concluded that no purchases subsequent to group formation were
necessary to trigger the filing requirement, much of the required in-
formation under 13 (d) concerns purchases and purchasers.3 r Use of
this term "purchase" might indicate that Congress considered a sub-
sequent purchase of significant size to be a prerequisite to filing. Also,
in absence of such a purchase, three of the five items required to be
filed are inapplicable." It is inconceivable that Congress intended that
a group, such as the Milsteins, need only file the remaining two items.
The court did not note this problem. 37
Secondly, the court's interpretation of the statutory provision is
questionable. Subsection 3 of 13(d) provides that persons who act
as a group to acquire, hold or sell securities are "persons" for purposes
of 13(d) (1). To trigger the 13(d) (1) filing requirement a "person"
must acquire a beneficial interest in some class of registerable securities,
The court's interpretation makes these two requirements redundant, for
as the group holds the securities it simultaneously acquires them.
the Williams Act voting control is the only significant aspect of beneficial interests. But
see C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1972). "In determining . . .whether a person is . . . the
beneficial owner of securities . . . such person shall be deemed to be the beneficial
owner of securities . .. which such person has the right to acquire through . . .op-
tions, warrants, or rights or through the conversion of presently convertible securities."*
Adopted, SEC SEcunmEs ExcHANGE Acr OF 1934 RELEASE No. 8392 (August 30,
1968).
33. 453 F.2d 709, 716 citing the passage cited note 27 supra. However, the court
stated that the legislative history was consistent. Id. at 717. This bare conclusion
flies in the face of the entire conflict over section 13(d)(3). The court noted that
Professor Loss, Milstein's co-counsel, "informed us at the argument that the view set
forth in his treatise [rejecting the subsequent purchase requirement 6 L. Loss, SuU-
vms REGJLATION 3664 (Supp. 1969)] was a 'mistake' and that this passage is 'dia-
metrically opposed to the text of the statute' and the purpose and intent of the Williams
Act." 453 F.2d at 717 n.15. The court did not accept Professor Loss's recantation.
34. 453 F.2d 717.
35. § 13(d)(1)(A)-(C).
36. E.g., § 13(d)(1)(A) provides that, "the background and identity of all persons
by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected" must be
filed (emphasis added).
37. In a footnote the court paraphrased the information required and substituted
the word "person" for "purchaser." 453 F.2d at 717 n.5.
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Furthermore, the group did not actually "acquire" any interest in the
member's securities, rather the members of the Milstein family individ-
ually retained all rights in their own shares. Therefore, the court's
interpretation results in obvious constructional problems.
Thirdly, the court's evaluation of the legislative purpose of 13(d)
was inadequate in two respects. First, the court did not consider the
effect of its decision on the intended neutrality of the section.3 The
court's holding greatly favors management, which seems contrary to
the legislative intent. The second inadequacy is the court's treatment
of the purpose of the Williams Act. The Milstein court felt that
investors should have the benefit of disclosure whenever there was any
type of rapid large-scale aggregation of stockholdings. However, the
House Report indicates that such disclosures are required only after a
rapid large-scale purchase had been made.3 9 The Report does not
indicate why this requirement does not apply to 13(d) groups.
These problems do not necessarily reflect judicial error, but rather
the ambiguity of the section and its legislative history, which encourage
inconsistent interpretations. Predictably, the courts are divided in the
interpretation of the section. So far, the Supreme Court has refused to
settle the dispute.4" Unfortunately the ambiguous provisions of the
section have also been incorporated into the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code.4 With an eye toward congressional action,
correction of this ambiguity is recommended. The Institute should
change its act to treat groups separately from individuals. In that way
the Institute can tailor its provision to require filing in those instances
in which the Institute feels that a group's activities should be disclosed.
38. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
39. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
40. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Milstein case, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
41. ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Tent. Draft No. 1 (1972). Under § 276(b),
"[wihen two or more persons act in concern for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting
or disposing of securities, the group is considered a "person" for the particular purpose
to the extent that the Commission so prescribes by rule."
§ 604(b) provides: "A person who as a result of acquiring the beneficial ownership
of an equity security of a registrant becomes the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
cent of the class shall file. .....
See § 604(b) Comment 6, "The Reporter . . . reserves the question whether the
opening language of this section should be changed with respect to filing by groups
in light of GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), as to which a petition
for certiorari is pending." Since certiorari has been denied, see note 40 supra, the
questions about changes in the opening language should now be capable of resolution.
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